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# Relative Knowledge in Paul Karl Feyerabend

**ABDELHAK Boulakhras,**
Abdelhamid MEHRI - Constantine 2 university
Email : philosophiephilosophie016@gmail.com

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## Introduction:

The scientific development achieved by Western civilization as a result of elevating the authority of reason and experiment over what is religious and superstitious strengthened the status of the experimental method in all fields of human life, to the extent that experimentation became a real criterion for accepting any human knowledge. Without it, other types of knowledge that do not accept scientific experimentation cannot be accepted. Under this total dominance of experimentation, contemporary philosophers of science emerged, such as Gaston Bachelard through his philosophical view of applied rationalism, Karl Popper through the principle of falsifiability, Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Imre Lakatos in his theory of scientific research programs, and finally Paul Karl Feyerabend who presented a critical view of science in order to reconsider the truth of science. The critical revolution of research in Feyerabend arose through several influences from philosophers such as the Sophists regarding the issue of the relativity of human knowledge, John Stuart Mill through the idea of human freedom, Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language games, Karl Popper in his criticism of the principle of induction, the influence of Brownian motion from the biological scientist Robert Brown regarding random motion in physical phenomena, and also the Dadaist movement in art. Here exactly the theory of the relativity of knowledge crystallized in Feyerabend's thought and he became a critical contemporary philosopher of science in the twentieth century without rival.

Through his book entitled *Against Method*, Feyerabend attempted to criticize the experimental method in science. In light of this criticism that Feyerabend presented regarding the authoritarian nature of this scientific method, we can raise the following questions: How did Feyerabend invest what contemporary philosophers of science had proposed in building his philosophical thought? What is new that Feyerabend added to science so that it could develop further? And what are the prospects of relative knowledge in contemporary epistemology?

## First: Relative Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy of Science:

What Feyerabend presented in his theory of relative knowledge and his criticism of absolute or objective knowledge did not emerge from nothing. Rather, he stood on the shoulders of previous philosophers of science such as Gaston Bachelard, who is considered one of the pioneers of

French epistemology of rupture in the history and philosophy of science. Under determinism and indeterminism, Bachelard affirmed the existence of a break between Newtonian deterministic physics and contemporary indeterministic physics, beginning with the emergence of quantum physics and the theory of relativity. The crisis of physics first appeared with quantum physics, which studies the elementary particles of matter. When scientists attempted to study extremely small phenomena such as the atom and its components, the difficulty of believing in determinism and the impossibility of prediction became clear. "W. Heisenberg" (1901–1976) conducted an experiment on the properties of the atom through waves using the constant of "Max Planck" (1947–1958). It became clear that at the atomic level we are unable to determine the position of electrons if we determine their speed, and if we determine their speed we cannot determine their spatial position.

The laws we reached in Newtonian physics do not apply to the atomic world. From here one of the most important principles of physics began to collapse. Langevin says: "The theories of the atom in modern physics do not only destroy the principle of determinism, but also destroy the idea of strict and certain laws." In light of this statement we realize that we are no longer facing rigid laws that govern all fields of nature, but rather relations of uncertainty. The crisis of physics also returns to the theory of relativity, which abandoned Newton's idea of absolute time, replacing it with relative time that changes according to the position of observation. A moving person measures a time different from that measured by another person who is stationary. Likewise, the concept of writing did not remain fixed but became variable.

Bachelard attempted to support his position regarding indeterminism through the "kinetic theory of gases," where he explained that we do not know anything about the time in which the collision phenomenon occurs. How can we predict the initial phenomenon when it is not visible? The kinetic theory of gases therefore begins from an initial phenomenon that cannot be defined or determined; thus indeterminism is learned in what cannot be determined.

Within the debate between reason and experience, Bachelard states that knowledge begins from the rational and moves toward the real, and that it is verifiable. But the question is: how is this process achieved? Scientific thinking deals with a reality that contradicts ordinary reality and what is immediate, and it also deals with a reality whose basis is realized reason or tested reason. Scientific knowledge is in rupture with common knowledge or common sense, and experimentation is considered a form of supporting reason. Here Bachelard sought to correct the previous scientific view under the sanctification of reason by rationalists and the sanctification of experience by empiricists. He established a functional dialectic between the logic of reason and the logic of experience, where neither side can exclude the other because the nature of science contains both together.

Feyerabend also benefited from the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper in his criticism of the principle of induction. Popper produced a revolutionary transformation in contemporary philosophy of science, turning the course of science from the logic of justification to the logic of scientific discovery and continuous progress. Popper criticized the inductive approach to science, arguing that induction as an independent logical principle is incapable either because

it is derived from experience or from other logical principles. Those who accepted it did so because they believed that without induction science would be impossible. Popper simply considered that there is no problem because induction is merely a myth of our own making.
No number of observations of white swans can justify the conclusion that "all swans are white." Any universal statement can be falsified by finding a single case that proves it false. Popper asserts that similarity governs the relationship between particular statements, and these cannot justify universal statements; they can only falsify them. Science does not reach true universal propositions through induction but through deduction and falsification. Searching for true universal propositions therefore requires eliminating false propositions.
Popper offered a scientific alternative for understanding the truth of science through the principle of falsifiability, thanks to the requirement of scientific boldness. This boldness means entering the unknown and discovering the new. Truth is not evident as classical rationalists believed but lies behind what appears to us in the world. The degree of boldness can be measured by the distance between the apparent world and the truth proposed by conjecture. Aristarchus and Copernicus were great scientists because they assumed that the sun is the center of the universe, even though appearances suggested that it merely rests in the sky of the Earth.
Popper also adds that untested ideas and metaphysical ideas in particular are fertilizer that can nourish scientific ideas. From this we understand that Popper's ambitions to solve the problem of objectivity in science did not fully succeed, since everything is open to criticism, revision, and modification, so that knowledge remains permanently open rather than closed.
Within the framework of the relativity of knowledge, Thomas Kuhn presented his theory of the scientific paradigm, which changes from one era to another. This change makes science relative. Kuhn says: "History, if we look at it as something other than a sequence of stories and events over time, can lead to a decisive transformation in the image of science." From this we understand that the history of science should not be viewed as a fixed narrative of myths and legends but rather as a progressive revolutionary view, not a continuous cumulative one.
Kuhn also explains that "the image presented by these books about science will not be more than the image one forms of a country from a tourist guide." From this statement we understand that science can only be understood when we grasp its historical data and its deep hidden aspects. Therefore these books must be rewritten whenever science changes—whenever its problems, methods, and criteria change. Kuhn's philosophy reconciles two scientific trends, presenting a new logic manifested in dialectical logic. The gradual development of science leads to qualitative periods that become starting points for new quantitative accumulation. Normal science eventually produces anomalies leading to crises that culminate in the emergence of new science through both continuity and discontinuity.
According to Kuhn there is no final standard that can be relied upon to choose between scientific theories. This indicates the openness of Kuhn's understanding of science without closure.
In the context of the relativity of knowledge, Imre Lakatos attempted to make science relative through the idea of scientific research programs by rereading the history of science in its rational constructions. He cited Kant's saying: "Philosophy of science without history of science is

empty, and history of science without philosophy of science is blind." Lakatos reformulated it from Kant's statement that "sensory intuitions without concepts are blind, and concepts without sensory intuitions are empty." Thus the facts of the history of science are blind perceptions, and theories of philosophy of science are empty concepts; neither has value without the other.

Lakatos showed that the element of time plays a major role in the success of a scientific theory. What Ptolemy failed to achieve in astronomy was achieved by Galileo. Stilman Dirak explained this through Galileo's consistent application of mathematics to physics and physics to astronomy, which elevated mathematics, physics, and astronomy to an important and distinguished status. Although these sciences had always been considered separate, Galileo discovered their mutual relationship, opening new fields of research for scholars from very different specializations.

Lakatos also presented the comprehensive criterion for evaluating a theory, stating: "The methodology of scientific research programs is more suitable than any other methodology for approaching truth in our real world." Science progresses through competition between research programs. A scientific program is better than a competing one if it has a more progressive character, depending on the degree of its coherence and the number of predictions it generates. According to Lakatos the goal of science is truth, which can only be approached through the methodology of scientific research programs that provide the best means of estimating how close we have come to the truth.

**Second: The History and Philosophy of Science in Feyerabend:**

As we saw previously, knowledge is no longer objective and absolute according to the philosophers of science from whom Feyerabend drew inspiration. Human knowledge has become relative and changing from one era to another. All of this led Feyerabend to reconsider the understanding of the history of science and the nature of science itself.

Feyerabend asserts that it is absurd to hope to reduce science to a few simple methodological rules because of the complexity of its history. He writes: "The idea that science can and should be organized according to fixed and universal rules is both utopian and deceptively attractive. It is utopian because it implies an excessively simple conception of human abilities and the conditions that encourage or hinder their growth. It is deceptively attractive because attempts to impose such rules increase professional efficiency at the expense of our humanity. Moreover, such an idea is harmful to science because it neglects the physical and historical conditions and becomes more dogmatic. The only rule that survives is: 'Anything goes.'"

From this understanding of science we see that Feyerabend considered the total and fixed understanding of science to be a utopian conception empty of real content. Belief in absolute rules without change in understanding the universe causes science to stagnate.

Since Feyerabend adopts a relativistic view of science, he is not prepared to accept the superiority of science over other forms of knowledge. The idea that there can be a final decisive argument for the superiority of science over other forms of knowledge is rejected by him. He

compares science with voodoo, astrology, and other forms of knowledge, showing that these cannot be excluded based on any criterion of scientificity or rationality.

Feyerabend's view of science is subjective rather than objective, because distinguishing science from other forms of knowledge cannot be based on rationality or objectivity alone. Science was not born through induction alone but through historical efforts that contributed to building science alongside positive science.

Science is merely a **tradition** among other competing traditions. Therefore science cannot judge other traditions or forms of knowledge. A free society cannot be founded on a single scientific rationality, a single research tradition, or a single scientific method. Rather, it is founded on the plurality of traditions and the spirit of cooperation between civilizations, knowledge systems, and nations. There is no single criterion by which one can judge that one is better than another.

In his book *Against Method*, Feyerabend states that the question of method is a false question and that science has never been confined to one specific method. Rather, it is an anarchic project that recognizes no authority, and all methods may be useful. This scientific anarchism is not political but a temporary therapeutic approach for science. Feyerabend attacked both rationalists and empiricists because they sanctified one aspect of scientific development while ignoring other forms of knowledge. Science has no special method that distinguishes it from other intellectual activities.

In understanding the history of science, Feyerabend confirms that the invention, application, and historical development of theories show that science as a living institution is an integral part of history. Scientific theories multiply according to historical development and acquire multiple dimensions. Since science is linked to its history, it possesses subjectivity according to each culture, customs, traditions, and civilizational dimensions of human societies.

Regarding the nature of scientific theory, Feyerabend defines it as follows: "They are ways of looking at the world and accepting what influences our general beliefs, and consequently our experiences and our concept of reality." This means that scientific theories are not a single way of understanding the world but multiple ways shaped by beliefs, interpretations, and experiences derived from lived reality. Here we observe the relativistic character of knowledge in Feyerabend's thought, unlike the positivist empiricists who base knowledge only on the experimental method. Feyerabend's conception of scientific theory expands the field of knowledge rather than restricting it to a single method.

Incommensurability is one of the important points for Feyerabend in his analysis of science, since the meaning of concepts and their interpretation, and the observation statements that use these concepts, depend on the theoretical context in which they appear. In some cases, the basic principles of two competing theories may be so far apart that it becomes impossible even to formulate the principles of one of the theories within the limits (terms) of the other theory. As a result, the two competing theories do not share any of their respective observation statements, and because of this distance between the principles of the two theories, it is also impossible to carry out logical inference for some results of one of the theories starting from the principles of

the competing theory, within the perspective of comparison between them. These two theories are then incommensurable or disproportionate. Incommensurability is like the cornerstone in Feyerabend's relativistic philosophy, since this foundation makes it impossible to compare scientific theories with one another from different dimensions and angles, and the claim of incomparability is a fatal blow to the inductivists and logical positivists. ( ) What made relative knowledge in Feyerabend stand out is the prominence of incommensurability, which is considered the cornerstone in understanding science in a pluralistic way through the multiplicity of scientific concepts among scientific theories. Even if there is an apparent agreement in terms, there is still a difference in what is internal. For example, the concept of mass in Newton differs from the concept of mass in Einstein, although the mass is one, but it differs according to the nature of the scientific theory. For this reason, there is difficulty in comparing or preferring between scientific theories. Incommensurability destroyed everything claimed by the inductivists and the logical positivists.

Counter-induction does not only call us to develop hypotheses and theories that do not conform with theories and experience, but also to develop those theories that have failed in the process of competition. The task of science is development, not the complete abandonment of theses that have failed. If knowledge is understood in this way, it is not a series of theories that enjoy consistency and harmony with experience moving toward an ideal model, nor is it a gradual ascent toward truth, but rather an increasing ocean of alternatives that are mutually inconsistent and in conflict with experience (and perhaps incommensurable). Every theory and every myth is a part of a whole that pushes the rest of the parts toward greater clarity and distinction, and each contributes within the framework of this competitive process to increasing our awareness. In the end, Feyerabend confirms that counter-induction is not the alternative method he proposes, but rather something revealed by the history of science. ( ) Indeed, Feyerabend tried to highlight the hidden face of science through non-induction which creates competition between scientific theories, generates scientific alternatives, and explodes inconsistency, opposition, disorder, and contradiction. All of this as a whole generates new changing experiences. What surrounds Feyerabend's thought is the extent of the contradiction existing in his philosophical system, since counter-induction is not a substitute for induction, but rather a new discovery in the depth of the history of science.

**Third: The idea of method in Feyerabend and the position toward it:**

Due to the dominance of the positivist and experimental view of science according to a single method without giving importance to other methods, Feyerabend wanted to establish science according to multiple methods without subjecting it to one method, because this suppresses the freedom of human creativity. Feyerabend affirms that there is no scientific theory that translates reality as it is, because science in itself is contradictory and inconsistent. What exists in science is not only rational, but there is also something called the irrational. Therefore he sees that counter-induction has procedural value in the context of normal science just as deduction and induction do at least; but in moments of transformation it is more important than both, since

there is no theory that agrees with the facts. Here he says: “We must accept counter-induction in addition to accepting unsupported hypotheses.” ( ) In light of inconsistency, Feyerabend acknowledges that there is absolutely no scientific theory that has translated reality as it is. This is because the nature of science is not consistent but contradictory and disturbed, governed by surprises and coincidences. For this reason Feyerabend gives counter-induction a place, like induction and deduction, in building science. Counter-induction is what understands the sudden transformations of science more than the fixed principles of science.

Feyerabend explains the extent of the opposition of his idea of inconsistency to the rationalists who are keen on coherence, and to the empiricists who are keen on verification. Here he seeks to give an opposite idea to what the rationalists and empiricists proposed through the factor of innovation. The scientist does not have in his imagination a single scientific theory, but multiple and conflicting theories. Here Feyerabend says: “I consider the use of a group of overlapping and mutually inconsistent theories to be of fundamental importance for methodology. The rules themselves are used according to the desire of the practitioner, and experiments are interpreted according to the ideas that guide them. There are no rational limits to these uses and interpretations.” ( ) In inconsistency Feyerabend adds a new concept to the vocabulary of science, alongside the existence of consistency, order, and verification as proposed by the old and modern systems. What he presented is considered a new opening for understanding science from another perspective, such that innovation is controlled by several factors and conditions. Innovation is not confined to the logic of reason and the logic of experience; rather there are other unknown and unfamiliar angles, or what is known as the necessity of opening the path for human creativity without placing fixed conceptual barriers, because they freeze science without adding new theories. Here we somewhat realize that Feyerabend linked science to the human subject according to desires and interpretations that read the reality of science as they want to read it, and the nature of readings is multiple without the tyranny of one reading over another.

We also find Feyerabend speaking about evidence and emotional states, where he says: “Evidence can delay science, while disappointment is necessary to push science forward.” ( ) What we understand from this statement is that science is governed by conscious and rational states according to fixed and decisive evidence in the development of science. In Feyerabend’s understanding, evidence delays the development of science and hinders its progress, but he focuses on the unconscious, psychological, and subconscious side, or what is called free associations, temporary hypotheses, or despair and frustration. That is, psychological factors have a role in pushing science forward more than the presence of hope based on evidence drawn in the depth of scientific theories that were established according to the logic of reason and scientific experiments.

Feyerabend also says: “When I speak about theories, I mean that they include myths, political ideas, and religious doctrines. I also see that the expression ‘point of view’ applies at least to some aspects of everything that exists.” ( ) Indeed, what Feyerabend wanted was to highlight a hidden truth behind scientific theories, namely that science is a human and subjective product according to the nature of the self and its mythological, political, religious, and artistic

conditions. Science is understood in multiple ways according to human cultures and civilizations. No matter how science is established according to strict scientific rules, it is not far from inclinations and desires, and this is what the history of science has confirmed up to the present day.

Feyerabend strongly insists that science is full of contradictions. In this regard he says: "Scientific theories, containing contradictions, progress and lead to new discoveries and expand our horizon. This of course means that contradictions in science are not treated according to the naive rules of formal logic." ( ) The progress of scientific theories in terms of development returns to contradiction rather than order or strict laws. The origin and essence of scientific discovery are sought from the diversity of scientific methods without the existence of restrictions in that.

"The condition of increasing content is considered proof that counter-induction plays an important role whether in the field of theories or facts, and that it contributes to the progress of science. Feyerabend concludes that those rationalists use the increase of content as a weapon to silence their opponents even in circumstances in which this weapon is doubtful." ( ) Counter-induction according to Feyerabend addresses the irrational in creating scientific theories, but this hidden aspect in science is cancelled by the extreme rationalists who believe that the logic of reason is the active driver in the development of science, and without it science cannot know absolute progress. Therefore we find Feyerabend opposing the rationalists' view because in his understanding it is an exaggerated closed view, that is, it contains a kind of stimulation of the logic of reason and the exclusion of other cognitive angles. Feyerabend wanted, through the idea of counter-induction, to expand the field of science and understand it in multiple ways rather than in a single one. This is a historical truth that cannot be denied at all.

Here Feyerabend sees that "John Stuart Mill" represents a pioneer in supporting pluralism. He sees that the opinions and practices of "Bohr" reflect the depth of their conviction that pluralism of ideas and ways of life is a necessary requirement for any rational inquiry concerned with the nature of things. He also sees that unity of opinion may be appropriate for the church, the enlightened, and those who wish to follow a despot. ( ) Indeed, Feyerabend was greatly influenced by the English philosopher "John Stuart Mill" regarding the place of freedom and intellectual, political, religious, scientific, and artistic pluralism, and also by "Bohr" on the issue of the multiplicity of ideas and diverse patterns of life.

The method that favors diversity is also the only one that agrees with the human perspective. Here Feyerabend advises us to overcome the chauvinism dominating science, which fights the alternatives to the status quo. Science that aspires to increase empirical content, or whose aspects should be understood as much as possible in its theory, will adopt a pluralistic methodology, will compare theories with others, and will attempt to develop—rather than exclude—what has failed in competition.

What we understand from the idea of methodological pluralism that he advocated is that he opened the door widely toward different viewpoints and alternatives to the accepted viewpoints, and it works to compare ideas with each other and benefit from all viewpoints, even those that

were rejected in the past by their competitors. Here Feyerabend states: “The rationality that I seek is not to arrive at an ideal theory; rather it is to increase the sphere of alternatives and to use all theories, even those that retreated long ago and became forgotten, because perhaps they contain a utopian element that benefits our knowledge.” ( ) Here Feyerabend calls for rationality not in its old meaning but in its new meaning, that is, the rationality that increases the sphere of cognitive alternatives whether they are old or new without excluding any of them, because what is old knowledge may contain metaphysical ideas that serve our knowledge today. Here we find Feyerabend declaring that science must adopt a pluralistic methodology that uses many alternatives, and these alternatives have many sources. We may take them from ancient myths, from Copernican theory or atomic theory, from the tribes of voodoo, or from ancient Chinese medicine. All these kinds of knowledge may benefit the rationality that we seek. ( ) Feyerabend strongly insists on the generation of multiple cognitive alternatives not on the basis of cancellation and erasing what is old and what has failed, but on the birth of cognitive alternatives that have their own weight, and through their multiplication the existence of science is strengthened toward further development. Here Feyerabend stresses the necessity of drawing from ancient cognitive sources through old myths that deal with scientific issues according to several cultural traditions and customs. Even atomic theory has a historical extension before Christ in both Eastern civilizations and Greek civilizations. Even some tribes believed to be savage and uncivilized, whose culture is considered meaningless, are defended by Feyerabend against the idea that cancels cultural existence in the construction of science. All cognitive sources can serve scientific rationality in developing various scientific patterns.

Feyerabend is considered the first who clearly opposed the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. His objection to this distinction goes back to an article he wrote in 1961 entitled: “Knowledge without foundations oberlin college”.

Feyerabend sees that accepting the results of any scientific experiment mixes with subjective elements and personal tendencies of different groups of scientists. Hence the distinction between these two contexts is unreal and artificial. Discovery cannot be merely random stumbling, but includes many elements of logical inference, just as justification includes many subjective elements. This appears in Feyerabend’s statement: “The distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification is unreal. Discovery is never a leap in the dark or a dream… just as justification is never a completely objective procedure.” ( )

Freedom for Feyerabend lies in liberation from the control of institutions and educational methods over our minds, and in allowing the greatest possible number of ideas and other traditions. Here he says: “We must realize that the freedom I seek may be valid in light of ideas that work to increase our freedom.” ( ) The nature of freedom that Feyerabend wants and requires is freedom that respects plurality and gives the right to creativity of any kind to every individual without restricting creativity within one mold or under institutional supervision by suppressing and eliminating ideas that do not conform to scientific reality. He even criticizes educational methods that in fact generate plurality in creativity and innovation, something we observe in some developed countries today.

Feyerabend clarifies the meaning of true freedom that establishes the humanity of the human being, not the freedom that restricts the human and makes him live as a slave to some method, policy, or doctrine. In this regard he sees that liberating individuals does not occur by subjecting them to a new kind of slavery, whether this slavery is a fixed scientific method or a rigid political ideology. Rather liberation means their awareness of their own desires. ( ) Modern science according to the experimental method formed an absolute tyranny that established a special type of slavery. Although liberalism calls for pluralism in ways of life, this has not been realized in our time. Even the idea of globalization as a method of domination and ideological discourse, despite America and developed countries claiming democracy, has practiced a deadly authoritarian system with other countries of the world. Where then is the meaning of liberation?

Feyerabend affirms through the history of science that there is no single scientific theory that does not owe, even slightly, to activities and procedures that are non-scientific. A scientist may derive the first seeds of his theoretical ideas from myth, popular wisdom, or various social customs and practices. ( ) This is a decisive acknowledgment from Feyerabend from the depth of the history of science that there is a historical truth confirming that modern science has drawn from ancient knowledge, developing it according to the experimental method and discarding what does not submit to experimentation. Previous myths had an effective role in stimulating science in many human civilizations. Even popular wisdom expressed in ancient times remains valid for every time and place. For this reason modern science derived many fruitful ideas from it that pushed science toward further progress. In addition, customs, traditions, and various social practices, although they are oral and unwritten phenomena, contain rich and very great ideas that moved the course of modern science, which then became dominant in its development upon the shoulders of heavy oral burdens testified by human history.

Feyerabend does not equate myth with science, but he said: “The achievements of the makers of myth in earlier ages are better than the achievements of scientists in all ages, and the first inventors of myth began civilization, while scientists merely changed it, and not always for the better.” ( ) Here Feyerabend prefers myth to modern science on the grounds that human beings since the dawn of history began from zero, from nothing, and produced what is called human civilization in the full sense of the word. Most scientific achievements were born from myth or ancient mythology. For example, atomic physics today, before becoming scientific, was mythical ideas. Democritus spoke philosophically in the pre-Christian era about the origin of the universe, stating that the atom is the origin of the universe in a cosmological interpretation of the world we live in, considering that the atom according to the understanding of early philosophers was something indivisible. Even in the Islamic era we find Islamic philosophers speaking about the “indivisible substance” as the source of the universe on a metaphysical basis, something hidden that cannot be seen by the naked eye.

Feyerabend also insists that just as astronomers benefited from the Pythagorean doctrine and from Plato’s love of circles, medicine also benefited from herbal treatment, physiognomy, metaphysics, the physiology of fortune tellers, midwives, clever men, and traveling medicine

sellers. Science becomes richer everywhere by using non-scientific methods and reaching non-scientific results, while procedures that were often regarded as parts of science were postponed and completely surrounded. ( )

Within the role of myth in building science, Feyerabend wanted to show how modern astronomy benefited from the mathematical method in quantitative estimation of planets, completing what was lacking in the instruments and tools of astronomy. This was embodied in Pythagorean geometry and also in Platonic philosophy through its sequence inherent in mathematics. Modern medicine also took much from the idea of natural herbal treatment rather than artificial treatment. Even physiognomy, which studies hereditary temperaments in an intuitive way, metaphysics, the effectiveness of fortune tellers in knowing the human future—today known as human development or the science of the human future and its prospects—midwives and their role in delivering women in natural ways, and those who sell medicinal herbs of various kinds. All these ancient kinds of knowledge contributed to serving contemporary science.

Feyerabend declares that there is equality between cultures in all fields, and this is the truly free society. In his view, a society that tries to impose its cultural values on other weaker cultures commits injustice and oppression against them. Here he says: “A society in which all traditions and cultures have equal rights regardless of the conception of other cultures about them.” ( )

This is a clear call from Feyerabend for the equivalence and balance among multiple cultures without canceling or destroying any culture. Unfortunately, Western society wants to impose its civilizational model on the countries of the world in various fields of life, something we observe today in globalization and in the implementation of the American project through domination. This is the dream of the West—complete sovereignty without deficiency. The model of globalization is nothing but a manifestation of tyranny and oppression against the cultures of the world aiming at producing cultural unity. According to Feyerabend this is injustice against humanity. What Feyerabend wants is the realization of a free society that breathes honest democracy without tyranny. What he wanted was to correct the course of Western societies.

Feyerabend also affirms that the desired democracy within the free society is the one that gives every cognitive tradition the opportunity to express itself. However, contemporary Western society has only one tradition, scientific rationality based on one method and one scientific theory, which has threatened democracy itself. Therefore Feyerabend calls for a scientific rationality of open exchange. This rationality allows all traditions, cultures, and non-Western sciences to participate equally in human scientific progress and rejects the stigma of backwardness and reaction that has been attached to non-Western science and culture. ( )

Feyerabend wants to examine Western democracy again because inwardly it is not truly democratic, even though outwardly it appears to be so. Therefore he wanted to establish an open democracy in its real meaning, not the false one. This is what truly establishes a free society, because civilizational development arises from the contribution of different cultural traditions without eliminating one tradition in favor of another. What is criticized in

contemporary Western society is that it tried to embody only one tradition—scientific rationality—in various fields. This tyranny threatens the existence of democracy and even eliminates it from human existence. Feyerabend tried to give an open rationality that accepts all methods and cultural and civilizational traditions, Western and non-Western, in order to achieve greater civilizational progress.

**Fourth: The prospects of relative knowledge in contemporary epistemology:**

Within modern and contemporary epistemology and its absolute and objective language in building science, as proposed by logical positivists, rationalists, empiricists, and formal logicians, science was considered to proceed according to fixed and objective principles far from the human subject, that is, far from our desires and inclinations.

On this basis science was established because it created a break with ancient knowledge. Here exactly Feyerabend imposed a new epistemology opposing what the old and contemporary epistemologies proposed. It is an anarchistic epistemology aiming to open the field of science more widely as long as knowledge is encyclopedic and open. In this regard Feyerabend says: "Epistemology today is sick and in need of medicine, and the medicine is anarchism." ( ) Indeed this is true, because epistemology today is sick since it believed in one single method for the development of science. The experimental method became the main criterion for judging true and false issues, or in the expression of logical positivists, false or meaningless propositions. Feyerabend wanted to give the right to study these propositions that were said to be meaningless.

As long as positivist, experimental, and inductive scientific mentality dominated minds and tyrannized human thought entirely, this means that science proceeds according to one fixed path without change. This cognitive system alone is not sufficient for the development of science. Therefore Feyerabend sees that anarchism is not only possible but necessary for the progress of ideas in science and in the fabric of culture as a whole. ( )

Within anarchistic epistemology he says: "The traveler uses the map to find his way, but he corrects it on his way by removing old representations and introducing new ones. It does not matter what problems he will encounter while using the map, but having the map is better than walking without it." ( )

Through this realistic example used by Feyerabend, we realize the moderation of his philosophical position. The traveler uses the map, that is, he proceeds according to a program or a single method, but this does not mean that the map is everything, because the human modifies the map due to the crises he encounters. These crises push him to modify and give other ideas without removing the map from the cognitive existence. Here we sense the moderation of Feyerabend's scientific philosophical approach.

The skeptical tendency appears in Feyerabend through his attack and defense of the same principle many times. He often uses expressions that remind us immediately of the early skeptics. This appears in his statement: "Total knowledge is neither necessary nor available. All that is available are different points of view that are true only in some respects, and there

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are no opinions that are not connected to a certain tradition." ( ) All knowledge is not available in a single way but through multiple ways. It is not always true but only sometimes. Here Feyerabend confirms that there are no philosophical or scientific positions that are not related to specific traditions.

Within the equality between science and other kinds of knowledge, Feyerabend showed that there is no difference between what is called science and voodoo (a method of reconciliation between rituals), or astrology and other forms of knowledge of the same type. These latter forms cannot be excluded according to any scientific or rational criterion. ( ) Here Feyerabend showed that there is no difference between science and voodoo. Voodoo is a type of black magic whose followers use spirits and jinn to serve them. This belief appeared in Africa as a result of European occupation. Although Africans differ in religion, the fear that these religions would be erased led to their fusion in a religion called voodoo or spirit worship. Not understanding this religion does not mean that it is not knowledge. Therefore Feyerabend rejected the idea of not accepting ancient knowledge because it calls us to greater knowledge, since there are cognitive standards that modern science eliminated from the space of human knowledge.

Despite what Feyerabend presented in giving a new anarchistic epistemology in the world of contemporary epistemology, it did not escape criticism both positive and negative. Within this double criticism we find Alan Chalmers directing both positive and negative criticism at the same time. Chalmers acknowledges that people's tastes are not liberated by rational argument alone but are strongly subject to the influence of the material conditions in which the individual lives and is shaped. However, subjective judgments and individual wishes are not sacred and untouchable things nor merely given facts; they are open to criticism and change through modifying material conditions. Feyerabend confirms that science includes a subjective element because it provides the scientist with a degree of freedom absent "in the most ordinary parts of science." ( ) Chalmers agrees with Feyerabend that subjective judgments, individual ambitions, and hopes of human beings are discussed, criticized, and debated with multiple opinions. Chalmers shares Feyerabend's view about giving scientists freedom, since this encourages creativity without end.

Chalmers also criticizes Feyerabend regarding the idea that the human being is free and should follow his personal inclinations and do what he thinks he must do. If we adopt this view, it may very likely lead to a situation where those who already possess power maintain it. Saying that everything is good practically means the continuation of the existing situation as it is. ( ) What Chalmers noticed is the extent of the freedom Feyerabend granted to the individual regarding his desires and inclinations to do whatever he wants without limits. This absolute freedom is another form of human tyranny, because whoever possesses freedom in knowledge gains power and domination over people, which is injustice against humanity. Also, saying that everything is good means letting things continue as they are, which is stagnation and rigidity in science, according to Chalmers' criticism of Feyerabend.

We also find Goodman supporting methodological pluralism and epistemic relativism but rejecting the idea of equality among all human knowledge: "The desire to accept multiple

versions does not mean failing to distinguish lies, but rather that truth must be conceived differently from conceiving it as correspondence with a pre-existing finished world." ( )
Goldman also criticizes Feyerabend on the issue that the latter gives importance to theories or hypotheses over scientific experiments. He says: "A broad mind does not undermine serious work." ( ) This statement clearly shows that Goldman gives more importance to experimentation than to hypothesis.
We also find Nais opposing Feyerabend's thought when he says: "Feyerabend's methodological and Dadaist anarchism is compatible with my pluralistic conception, but there is a great difference in emphasis […] not everything is permissible." ( ) There is agreement between Nais and Feyerabend within the framework of anarchism and methodological pluralism, but they differ on the issue that Feyerabend believes that everything is good or permissible, while Nais insists that everything must have limits that scientists must respect.
We also find Andrew Pickering criticizing Feyerabend regarding the anarchism of science when he says: "The empirical foundation of science is more fragile than dogmatism usually assumes, but it is not anarchic." ( ) This is an acknowledgment by Pickering that experimentation becomes weaker according to the stakes of contemporary science, but he does not accept that science becomes random and anarchic without stability.
The French anthropologist Bruno Latour also acknowledges what Feyerabend presented, as he established under his influence what is called "the new sociology of sciences" and the issue of the relativistic approach in building scientific knowledge, since it works according to agreement among scientists more than according to phenomena and evidence that cannot be refuted. ( )

**Conclusion:**
In conclusion, it can be said that Feyerabend, through the idea of anarchistic epistemology or what is called relativistic epistemology, succeeded in achieving his scientific aim of correcting some old and modern epistemologies in their materialistic and experimental unilateral approach without giving value to other forms of knowledge. What Feyerabend presented did not come from nothing but resulted from several epistemologies: the epistemology of applied rationalism of Gaston Bachelard, the epistemology of falsificationist rationalism of Karl Popper, the epistemology of scientific paradigms of Thomas Kuhn, the epistemology of scientific research programs of Imre Lakatos, and finally anarchistic epistemology or methodological pluralistic epistemology as a necessary result of the previous epistemologies and as a contingent result in its epistemological structure.
Indeed Feyerabend tried to rebuild science again according to its real foundations rather than false ones from the depth of the history of science. He restored the subjective and irrational aspect of knowledge. This means making knowledge multiple rather than single, which is known as methodological pluralism that generated new cognitive concepts without canceling one concept for another. Human freedom is the active foundation in moving science forward. He is truly a philosopher of human science who restored the value of science from the grip of the enemies of science and knowledge alike.

Anarchistic epistemology is considered the third revolution in physics, with full recognition and objectivity, because it influenced contemporary philosophy of science such as philosophers and scientists like Alan Chalmers, Bruno Latour, and many others.

Finally, we say that Feyerabend made scientific knowledge relative and subjective instead of being objective and absolute. This is considered a scientific project that develops human knowledge forward.

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